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The recent case of Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,1 is only the
second Supreme Court decision applying the separability doctrine and it comes
nearly forty years after the Court’s first separability decision, Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.2  Arbitration’s tremendous
* Professor of Law, University of Kansas.  Thanks to Chris Drahozal, Alan Rau, Natalie
Chalmers, and Cheri Whiteside.  This article is largely based on, and reproduces without
further attribution material from, Stephen J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration:  Chapter 1 of the
Federal Arbitration Act, in EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT &
STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 90-102
(2006), and Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 83, 128-38 (1996), reprinted with permission from the Hofstra Law Review
Association.
1 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
2 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).  Lower courts had
adopted it earlier. See, e.g., Arthur Nussbaum, The “Separability Doctrine” in American
107
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growth during those forty years—and the arrival of Buckeye—make this an
opportune time to assess the current state of the separability doctrine.3  In doing
that, this Article will analyze Prima Paint and Buckeye and discuss the separa-
bility issues they leave unresolved.  Finally, this Article will critique the separa-
bility doctrine and call for its repeal by Congress.
I. THE SUPREME COURT CASES
A. Prima Paint
The separability doctrine can be understood by starting with the facts of
the Prima Paint case.  F&C sold its paint business to Prima Paint.4  F&C sold
to Prima Paint a list of F&C’s customers and promised not to sell paint to these
customers for six years.5  F&C also promised to act as a consultant to Prima
Paint during these six years.6  This consulting agreement included an arbitra-
tion clause.7  Prima Paint did not make payments provided for in the consulting
agreement.8  Prima Paint contended that F&C had fraudulently represented that
it was solvent and able to perform its contract, but, in fact, was insolvent and
intended to file for bankruptcy shortly after executing its consulting agreement
with Prima Paint.9
F&C served upon Prima Paint a “notice of intention to arbitrate.”10  Prima
Paint then sued F&C in federal court seeking rescission of the consulting agree-
ment (due to the alleged misrepresentation) and an order enjoining F&C from
proceeding with arbitration.11  F&C cross-moved to stay the suit pending arbi-
tration.12  The trial court granted F&C’s motion, staying Prima Paint’s suit
pending arbitration.13  The Supreme Court affirmed.14
Although the Court ruled against Prima Paint, the Court did not reject
Prima Paint’s argument that F&C fraudulently induced Prima Paint to sign the
consulting agreement.  The Court did not address this argument.  In fact, the
Court held that no court should address this argument.  This argument should
be addressed by the arbitrator.
The Court said that its result is compelled by section 4 of the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which provides that if
and Foreign Arbitration, 17 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 609, 615 (1940) (“On the whole, it may be
said that the separability doctrine has gained a solid footing in this country.”).
3 See Richard L. Barnes, Buckeye, Bull’s-Eye, or Moving Target:  The FAA, Compulsory
Arbitration, and Common-Law Contract, 31 VT. L. REV. 141 (2006); Alan Scott Rau, “Sep-
arability” in the United States Supreme Court, 2006 STOCKHOLM INT’L ARB. REV. 1.
4 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 397.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 398.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 398-99.
12 Id. at 399.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 404-05.
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[a] party [claims to be] aggrieved by the alleged failure . . . of another to arbitrate . . .
[t]he court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court
shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration . . . .  If the making
of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be
in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.15
This provision says that the court shall not order the parties to arbitration if “the
making of the arbitration agreement” is in issue.16  If the making of the arbitra-
tion agreement is in issue then the court proceeds to trial on that issue.  If the
trial determines that an arbitration agreement was made then the court orders
the parties to arbitration.  Conversely, if the trial determines that an arbitration
agreement was not made then the court does not order the parties to arbitration.
In short, FAA section 4 rests on the basic premise that the parties should be
ordered to arbitration if, but only if, they have contracted to be there.
The Supreme Court held in Prima Paint that there would be no trial on the
question of whether an arbitration agreement was made.17  Prima Paint was not
entitled to such a trial because its allegations of fraudulent inducement did not
put in issue the question of whether an “arbitration agreement” was made.  That
is because the term “arbitration agreement,” as used in FAA section 4, refers
specifically to the arbitration clause itself, not more broadly to the consulting
contract of which the arbitration clause was a part.  If Prima Paint had argued
that there was fraud “directed to the arbitration clause itself,”18 then the making
of the arbitration agreement would have been in issue and Prima Paint would
have been entitled to a trial on that issue.19  But FAA section 4, the Supreme
Court held, “does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in the
inducement of the contract generally.”20
This holding is known as the “separability” doctrine because it treats the
arbitration clause as if it is a separate contract from the contract containing the
arbitration clause, that is, the “container contract.”  The Prima Paint Court held
that
arbitration clauses as a matter of federal law are “separable” from the contracts in
which they are embedded, and that where no claim is made that fraud was directed to
the arbitration clause itself, a broad arbitration clause will be held to encompass arbi-
tration of the claim that the contract itself was induced by fraud.21
In other words, the separability doctrine is a legal fiction that, in addition to the
container contract, the parties also formed a second contract consisting of just
the arbitration clause.22  This fictional second contract requires arbitration of
15 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
16 Id.
17 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404.
18 Id. at 402.
19 See, e.g., id. at 404 (citing Moseley v. Elec. & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167, 171-
72 (1963)); Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
20 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404.
21 Id. at 402.
22 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 56 (2d ed. 2001) (“The
separability doctrine provides that an arbitration agreement, even though included in and
related closely to an underlying commercial contract, is a separate and autonomous agree-
ment.”); John J. Barceló III, Who Decides The Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction?  Separability and
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ106.txt unknown Seq: 4 16-JAN-08 14:10
110 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:107
disputes over whether the container contract was induced by fraud.  Courts
applying the separability doctrine enforce the fictional second contract when
they send to arbitration disputes over whether the container contract was
induced by fraud.
B. Buckeye
While fraud was the basis of the challenge to the arbitration agreement in
Prima Paint, illegality (or “public policy”) was the basis of the challenge in
Buckeye,23 the Supreme Court’s second separability decision.24  The container
contract in Buckeye was a “Deferred Deposit and Disclosure Agreement,” pur-
suant to which Buckeye provided Cardegna with cash in exchange for a per-
sonal check in the amount of the cash plus a finance charge.25  Cardegna sued
in Florida state court, “alleging that Buckeye charged usurious interest rates
and that the Agreement violated various Florida lending and consumer-protec-
tion laws, rendering it criminal on its face.”26  Buckeye moved to stay the liti-
gation and compel arbitration of Cardegna’s claims.27
The Florida Supreme Court ruled for Cardegna.  It held that “the Florida
courts, and not an arbitrator, must first determine the contract’s legality before
[Cardegna] may be required to submit to arbitration under a provision of the
contract.”28  The Florida Supreme Court distinguished Prima Paint on the
ground that
in Prima Paint, the claim of fraud in the inducement, if true, would have rendered the
underlying contract merely voidable.  In [Buckeye], however, the underlying contract
at issue would be rendered void from the outset if it were determined that the contract
indeed violated Florida’s usury laws.  Therefore, if the underlying contract is held
entirely void as a matter of law, all of its provisions, including the arbitration clause,
would be nullified as well.29
The Florida Supreme Court was not alone in making this distinction; several
other courts had also applied the separability doctrine to voidable-contract
Competence-Competence in Transnational Perspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1115,
1119 (2003) (Prima Paint “hold[s], in effect, that when parties enter a main contract
(container contract) and include in it a broadly worded arbitration clause, a court will treat
them as having concluded two separate contracts, the container contract and an arbitration
agreement.  This means that if a party challenges the validity of the container contract . . . , a
court should send that issue to the arbitrators as long as nothing in the claim attacks the
validity of the arbitration agreement directly.”).
23 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
24 Buckeye actually uses the term “severability,” id. at 445, rather than “separability.”  Inter-
estingly, courts seem to have a slight preference for the former term, while scholars seem to
have a stronger preference for the latter.  On May 31, 2007, searches in Westlaw’s “allcases”
database revealed 45 cases with the search “arbitration & ‘severability doctrine’” and 38
cases with the search “arbitration & ‘separability doctrine.’”  By contrast, in Westlaw’s “jlr”
database (consisting primarily of law review articles), the first search produced 57 entries,
while the latter produced 160.
25 Id. at 442.
26 Id. at 443.
27 Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860, 861 (Fla. 2005).
28 Id. at 865.
29 Id. at 863.
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arguments (which were sent to the arbitrator) but not to void-contract argu-
ments (which were sent to the court).30
By contrast, the United States Supreme Court held in Buckeye that the
separability doctrine applies to void-contract arguments as well as to voidable-
contract arguments.  The Court said:
 It is true, as respondents assert, that the Prima Paint rule permits a court to enforce
an arbitration agreement in a contract that the arbitrator later finds to be void.  But it
is equally true that respondents’ [anti-separability] approach permits a court to deny
effect to an arbitration provision in a contract that the court later finds to be perfectly
enforceable. Prima Paint resolved this conundrum—and resolved it in favor of the
separate enforceability of arbitration provisions.  We reaffirm today that, regardless
of whether the challenge is brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the valid-
ity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to
the arbitrator.31
Thus, Buckeye rejects the void/voidable distinction and reaffirms Prima Paint’s
distinction between arguments challenging the enforceability of the container
contract and arguments directed at the arbitration clause itself.
In addition, Buckeye also resolves doubt about whether the FAA requires
state, as well as federal, courts to apply the separability doctrine.  The pre-
Buckeye belief that states were free to depart from the separability doctrine
followed from the fact that Prima Paint’s reasoning rested on FAA sections 3
and 4, which by their terms appear to apply only to proceedings in federal
court.32  Nevertheless, Buckeye held that the separability doctrine applies in
state court and preempts any inconsistent state law because it rests on FAA
section 2, which applies to proceedings in state, as well as federal, court.33
II. RECONCILING PRIMA PAINT AND BUCKEYE WITH
FIRST OPTIONS AND HOWSAM
A. The Distinction Between Formation of a Contract and Defenses to Its
Enforcement
As noted above, Buckeye ruled that courts must send to arbitrators any
“challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole,”34 (the container contract),
while courts themselves must resolve any challenge directed “specifically to the
30 See, e.g., Burden v. Check Into Cash of Ky., LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir. 2001)
(“The void/voidable distinction is relevant for Prima Paint analysis because a void contract,
unlike a voidable contract, was never a contract at all.”); Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 1991); Jolley v. Welch, 904 F.2d 988,
993-94 (5th Cir. 1990); Rainbow Invs., Inc. v. Super 8 Motels, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 1387,
1390-91 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Allstar Homes, Inc. v. Waters, 711 So. 2d 924, 927 (Ala. 1997).
31 Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 448-49.
32 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 n.6
(1989) (“[W]e have never held that §§ 3 and 4, which by their terms appear to apply only to
proceedings in federal court, . . . are nonetheless applicable in state court.”).
33 546 U.S. at 447. Buckeye said that, “[a]lthough § 4, in particular, had much to do with
Prima Paint’s understanding of the rule of severability, . . . this rule ultimately arises out of
§ 2, the FAA’s substantive command that arbitration agreements be treated like all other
contracts.  The rule of severability establishes how this equal-footing guarantee for ‘a written
[arbitration] provision’ is to be implemented.” Id.
34 Id. at 449.
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arbitration clause.”35  While arbitrators hear any challenge to the container con-
tract’s validity, Buckeye cautioned:
The issue of the contract’s validity is different from the issue of whether any agree-
ment between the alleged obligor and obligee was ever concluded.  Our opinion
today addresses only the former, and does not speak to the issue decided in the cases
cited by respondents (and by the Florida Supreme Court), which hold that it is for
courts to decide whether the alleged obligor ever signed the contract, Chastain v.
Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851 (CA11 1992), whether the signor lacked
authority to commit the alleged principal, Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d
99 (CA3 2000); Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587 (CA7
2001), and whether the signor lacked the mental capacity to assent, Spahr v. Secco,
330 F.3d 1266 (CA10 2003).36
Thus, Buckeye did not decide whether courts or arbitrators rule on arguments
denying that any container contract between the alleged obligor and obligee
was ever formed (“concluded”).  And Buckeye recognized that parties have
raised such arguments based on lack of (1) assent, (2) agency, and (3) capacity.
While Buckeye did not decide whether courts or arbitrators rule on these
three arguments, with respect to two of them—assent and agency—the
Supreme Court had already spoken.  In the 1995 (pre-Buckeye) case of First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,37 the Supreme Court effectively decided
that courts, rather than arbitrators, rule on assent and agency arguments deny-
ing that any container contract between the alleged obligor and obligee was
ever formed.  In other words, First Options effectively decided that the separa-
bility doctrine does not apply to such arguments because courts must rule on
them even though they challenge the container contract as a whole, rather than
the arbitration clause specifically.  This reading of First Options is supported
by dicta in a 2002 Supreme Court case, Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc.38
Curiously, however, neither First Options nor Howsam ever mentions the
separability doctrine (or Prima Paint), and Buckeye never mentions First
Options or Howsam.  These two lines of cases (Prima Paint and Buckeye on
the one hand, and First Options and Howsam on the other) have yet to con-
verge into a coherent whole.  For the sake of doctrinal coherence and clarity, I
hope this article contributes to that convergence.
The First Options case involved First Options, Kaplan, and Kaplan’s
wholly-owned company, MKI.  On a single date, First Options formed four
contracts with MKI and one of those four—the only one with an arbitration
clause—was also signed by Kaplan.39  When First Options sought to arbitrate
35 Id.
36 Id. at 444 n.1.
37 First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
38 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 82 (2002); see infra note 50 and
accompanying text.
39 Kaplan v. First Options of Chi., Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1506-07 (3d Cir. 1994).
On March 24, 1988, the Kaplans, MKI, and First Options separately executed four documents
evidencing an overall method of settling the dispute that had resulted from MKI’s October 19,
1987, deficit.  They were:  (1) a Letter Agreement executed by First Options, MKI, Mr. Kaplan,
Mrs. Kaplan, and certain other entities and individuals; (2) a Guaranty executed only by MKI;
(3) a Subordinated Loan Agreement executed by First Options, MKI, and a separate entity; and
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its claims against both MKI and Kaplan, MKI submitted to arbitration but
Kaplan objected to the arbitrators’ jurisdiction over him.40
 MKI, having signed the only workout document (out of four) that contained an
arbitration clause, accepted arbitration.  The Kaplans, however, who had not person-
ally signed that document, denied that their disagreement with First Options was
arbitrable and filed written objections to that effect with the arbitration panel.  The
arbitrators decided that they had the power to rule on the merits of the parties’ dis-
pute, and did so in favor of First Options.41
Kaplan sought to have the arbitration award vacated, but the district court
granted First Options’ motion to confirm the award.42  By contrast, the Third
Circuit and the Supreme Court ruled for Kaplan.  The Supreme Court described
three types of disagreement present in this case.  First, the Kaplans and First Options
disagree about whether the Kaplans are personally liable for MKI’s debt to First
Options.  That disagreement makes up the merits of the dispute.  Second, they disa-
gree about whether they agreed to arbitrate the merits.  That disagreement is about
the arbitrability of the dispute.  Third, they disagree about who should have the pri-
mary power to decide the second matter.  Does that power belong primarily to the
arbitrators (because the court reviews their arbitrability decision deferentially) or to
the court (because the court makes up its mind about arbitrability independently)?
We consider here only this third question.43
The Supreme Court’s answer to this third question is that the Third Circuit
correctly reviewed the arbitrators’ decision (that Kaplan and First Options
agreed to arbitrate the merits) “independently,” rather than under the deferential
standard of review FAA section 10 requires courts to use when reviewing an
arbitrator’s decisions on matters properly before the arbitrator.44  This holding
of First Options indicates that the separability doctrine does not apply to the
issue of whether particular parties “agreed to arbitrate”45 because the separabil-
(4) a Subordinated Promissory Note executed by MKI.  Only one of these four documents, the
Subordinated Loan Agreement, contained an arbitration clause, and only First Options, MKI and
the other entity, whose agreement to  arbitrate is not material to this case, signed that document.
Id.
40 Id. at 1508.
41 First Options, 514 U.S. at 941.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 942 (emphasis omitted).
44 We believe the answer to the “who” question (i.e., the standard-of-review question) is fairly
simple. . . .  Did the parties agree to submit the arbitrability question itself to arbitration?  If so,
then the court’s standard for reviewing the arbitrator’s decision about that matter should not
differ from the standard courts apply when they review any other matter that parties have agreed
to arbitrate. . . .  That is to say, the court should give considerable leeway to the arbitrator,
setting aside his or her decision only in certain narrow circumstances.  See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10.
If, on the other hand, the parties did not agree to submit the arbitrability question itself to
arbitration, then the court should decide that question just as it would decide any other question
that the parties did not submit to arbitration, namely, independently.
Id. at 943 (emphasis omitted).  “We conclude that, because the Kaplans did not clearly agree
to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration, the Court of Appeals was correct in
finding that the arbitrability of the Kaplan/First Options dispute was subject to independent
review by the courts.” Id. at 947.
45 Id. at 942.
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ity doctrine gives arbitrators the power to decide issues subject only to the
deferential standard of review in FAA section 10.46
Unfortunately, First Options does not mention Prima Paint or the word
“separability.”  But it did clearly hold that “the power to decide” whether
Kaplan and First Options “agreed to arbitrate” the merits “belong[s] primarily”
to the court rather than to the arbitrators.  And the issue of whether particular
parties “agreed to arbitrate” can, as Buckeye (later) stated, arise when a party
argues that no container contract between the alleged obligor and obligee was
ever formed (“concluded”) due to the lack of (1) assent, (2) agency, and (3)
capacity.47  As First Options was a case in which Kaplan relied on the first two
of these three arguments,48 the Court’s opinion in First Options should be read
as holding that courts, not arbitrators, rule on assent and agency arguments that
no container contract between the alleged obligor (Kaplan) and obligee (First
Options) was ever formed.  In other words, First Options should be read as
holding that the separability doctrine does not apply to contract-formation argu-
ments, or at least that it does not apply to contract-formation arguments based
on lack of assent or agency.49
Support for this reading of First Options is found in Howsam, a 2002
Supreme Court decision, which cites First Options for the proposition that “a
gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration
clause raises a ‘question of arbitrability’ for a court [rather than an arbitrator] to
decide.”50  Also reading First Options to hold that the separability doctrine
does not apply to contract-formation arguments is Judge Easterbrook’s opinion
for the Seventh Circuit in Sphere Drake Insurance Ltd. v. All American Insur-
ance Co.51 In this pre-Howsam-and-Buckeye case, Judge Easterbrook recog-
nized that Prima Paint “sits uneasily alongside” First Options,52 but he
46 CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:  CASES AND PROBLEMS 63 (2d
ed. 2006).
47 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
48 See Kaplan v. First Options of Chi., Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1514-16 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding
that Kaplan did not assent to a container contract with First Options and—rejecting applica-
tion of agency principles—holding that MKI’s assent to a container contract did not consti-
tute Kaplan’s assent to that container contract).
49 Capacity is discussed below. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
50 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002). Howsam involved an
investor’s claim against her securities broker.  The investor asserted her claim in arbitration
before the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), which had a rule providing
that “no dispute ‘shall be eligible for submission [to arbitration] . . . where six (6) years have
elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the . . . dispute.’” Id. at 82 (citing NASD
CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 10304 (1984)).  The broker sued in federal court
“ask[ing] the court to declare that the dispute was ‘ineligible for arbitration’ because it was
more than six years old.” Id.  The Supreme Court held that the NASD time-limit rule “falls
within the class of gateway procedural disputes” that is presumptively the province of arbi-
trators, not the courts. Id. at 85-86.  “‘[I]n the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
issues of substantive arbitrability . . . are for a court to decide and issues of procedural
arbitrability, i.e., whether prerequisites such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other
conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate have been met, are for the arbitrators to
decide.’” Id. at 85 (emphasis added) (quoting REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6, cmt. 2
(2000)).
51 Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 590-91 (7th Cir. 2001).
52 Id. at 590.
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reconciled the two cases with the distinction Buckeye would later make
between contract formation and defenses to the enforcement of an admittedly-
formed contract.53  Judge Easterbrook wrote:
Fraud in the inducement does not negate the fact that the parties actually reached an
agreement.  That’s what was critical in Prima Paint.  But whether there was any
agreement is a distinct question. Chastain [v. Robinson Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851
(11th Cir. 1992)] sensibly holds a claim of forgery must be resolved by a court.  A
person whose signature was forged has never agreed to anything.  Likewise with a
person whose name was written on a contract by a faithless agent who lacked author-
ity to make that commitment.  This is not a defense to enforcement, as in Prima
Paint; it is a situation in which no contract came into being . . . .54
So, in resolving the “uneas[y]” relationship between First Options and the
separability doctrine, Judge Easterbrook read First Options as holding that the
separability doctrine only applies to “defense[s] to enforcement,” not to argu-
ments that “no contract came into being.”55
In sum, there is strong support for reading First Options as holding that
the separability doctrine does not apply to contract-formation arguments.  Thus
the two lines of cases (Prima Paint/Buckeye on the one hand, and First
Options/Howsam on the other) should be read to converge into a coherent
whole consisting of the rule that the separability doctrine does not apply to the
question whether a particular party formed a contract containing an arbitration
clause but does apply to questions about defenses to the enforcement of that
contract.  Under this reading, courts would hear questions about mutual
assent,56 consideration, and authority to assent on behalf of others,57 while
53 Or, to use Buckeye’s words, “the issue of whether any agreement between the alleged
obligor and obligee was ever concluded” and “[t]he issue of the contract’s validity.”  Buck-
eye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 n.1 (2006).
54 Sphere Drake, 256 F.3d at 590-91.
55 Id.  Prior to Buckeye, Professor Richard Reuben went even further, reading First Options
as holding that courts (rather than arbitrators) hear not only arguments disputing contract
formation, but also arguments challenging the validity of admittedly-formed contracts.  In
other words, he read First Options as directly conflicting with the separability doctrine.
[T]he Court’s unanimous opinions in both First Options and Howsam were grounded in the need
for the law to support the parties’ expectations and to prevent the possibility that a court “might
too often force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would have thought a
judge, and not an arbitrator would decide.”  Such reasoning leads logically only to one conclu-
sion:  that courts should decide the validity of the container contracts, unless the parties clearly
and unmistakably agree to allocate that function to the arbitrator.  Indeed, it borders on the
absurd to suggest that a court troubled by such concerns would endorse a rule compelling into
arbitration a party to a legally unenforceable contract merely because of the presence of an
arbitration provision in the otherwise unenforceable contract.
Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability:
Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819,
875-76 (2003).  As it turned out, of course, Buckeye did not find it “absurd” to send to
arbitrators the validity of container contracts.
56 Will-Drill Res., Inc. v. Samson Res. Co., 352 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 2003); Opals on Ice
Lingerie v. Body Lines Inc., 320 F.3d 362, 372 (2d Cir. 2003); Chastain v. Robinson-
Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851, 856 (11th Cir. 1992); Jolley v. Welch, 904 F.2d 988, 993-94
(5th Cir. 1990); see also In re Neutral Posture, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 725, 728 (Tex. App. 2003)
(whether parties’ agreement to arbitrate expired by its terms is a question of the very exis-
tence of agreement to arbitrate and, thus, an issue of substantive arbitrability reserved for
judicial determination, rather than a question to be determined by an arbitrator).
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sending to arbitrators questions about misrepresentation (fraud in the induce-
ment),58 mistake,59 duress,60 undue influence,61 incapacity,62 unconscionabil-
ity,63 impracticability, frustration of purpose,64 the statute of frauds,65 the
statute of limitations,66 illegality (or “public policy”),67 and expiration or termi-
nation.68  However, these latter issues are sent to the arbitrator only if they are
57 Sphere Drake, 256 F.3d at 591; Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 104, 109
(3d Cir. 2000); see also Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 901 A.2d 381, 393 (N.J. 2006)
(parent had authority to bind minor to arbitration clause); Global Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Shea,
908 So. 2d 392, 394 (Fla. 2005) (same); Cross v. Carnes, 724 N.E.2d 828, 836 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1998) (court holds that parent had authority to bind minor to arbitration clause and
sends to arbitrators the question whether parent had authority to bind minor to the rest of the
container contract).
58 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406-07 (1967).
59 Masco Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 624, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2004); Unionmutual
Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 774 F.2d 524, 528-29 (1st Cir. 1985).
60 Serv. Corp. Int’l v. Lopez, 162 S.W.3d 801, 810 (Tex. App. 2005) (The duress “issue
relates to the contract as a whole and not solely the arbitration provision.  It is therefore an
issue to be decided in arbitration.”).
61 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 1981)
(duress and undue influence).
62 Federal courts have split on the question of mental incapacity. Compare, e.g., Spahr v.
Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 2003) (court decides defense of mental incapacity),
with Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2002) (arbitrator decides
defense of mental incapacity).  A related question is a minor’s lack of capacity to contract.
See H & S Homes, L.L.C. v. McDonald, 823 So. 2d 627, 630 (Ala. 2001) (limited discovery
allowed on minority issue at time of motion to compel arbitration in the trial court).  Capac-
ity is discussed further below. See infra Part II.B.
63 Substantive unconscionability of contract terms other than the arbitration clause is an
issue for the arbitrator, Bob Schultz Motors, Inc. v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 334
F.3d 721, 726-27 (8th Cir. 2003), while substantive unconscionability of the arbitration
clause is generally an issue for the court.  Banc One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426,
433 (5th Cir. 2004).
Allegations of procedural unconscionability require the adjudicator to consider the cir-
cumstances surrounding the making of the entire container contract, not just the arbitration
clause.  So procedural unconscionability may be an issue for the arbitrator, Jenkins v. First
Am. Cash Advance of Georgia, LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 877 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he FAA does
not permit a federal court to consider claims alleging the contract as a whole was adhe-
sive.”), unless combined with allegations that the arbitration clause itself is substantively
unconscionable. See also Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 (9th Cir.
2006) (en banc) (The court, rather than arbitrator, addresses procedural unconscionability of
a container contract because California law “requires the court to consider, in the course of
analyzing the validity of the arbitration provision, the circumstances surrounding the making
of the entire agreement.”).
64 Unionmutual, 774 F.2d at 528-29 (“[T]he arbitration clause is separable from the contract
and is not rescinded by [defendant]’s attempt to rescind the entire contract based on . . .
frustration of purpose.”); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541 F.2d 1263, 1271
(7th Cir. 1976).
65 Comprehensive Merch. Catalogs, Inc. v. Madison Sales Corp., 521 F.2d 1210, 1213-14
(7th Cir. 1975).
66 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 86 (2002); Wagner Constr. Co. v.
Pac. Mech. Corp., 157 P.3d 1029, 1031 (Cal. 2007); O’Keefe Architects, Inc. v. CED Con-
str. Partners, Ltd., 944 So. 2d 181, 188 (Fla. 2006).
67 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 442, 449 (2006).
68 ACE Capital Re Overseas Ltd. v. Cent. United Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 24, 34 (2d Cir.
2002); Ambulance Billings Sys., Inc. v. Gemini Ambulance Servs., Inc., 103 S.W.3d 507,
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challenges to the container contract as a whole; if they are “directed to the
arbitration clause itself,”69 then they are heard by courts.70
To recap, the Supreme Court:
(1) (in First Options, Howsam and Buckeye) distinguishes arguments that no
container contract was formed from arguments asserting defenses to the enforcement
of an admittedly-formed container contract, and
(2) (in Prima Paint and Buckeye) distinguishes defenses to the container contract
as a whole from defenses directed “specifically to the arbitration clause” itself.
The first of these distinctions leads courts, rather than arbitrators, to rule
on arguments that no container contract was formed.71  The second of these
distinctions leads courts to rule on defenses directed specifically to the arbitra-
tion clause itself, while sending to arbitrators defenses to the container contract
as a whole.
B. Professor Rau’s Rejection of the Supreme Court’s Distinctions
Both of the Supreme Court’s distinctions are criticized by a leading arbi-
tration scholar, Alan Scott Rau.  Whereas the Court says, “The issue of the
contract’s validity is different from the issue of whether any agreement
between the alleged obligor and obligee was ever concluded,”72 Professor Rau
questions the “abstract distinction between ‘invalidity’ and ‘nonexistence.’”73
“These are,” he says, “nothing but word balloons.”74  In addition, while both
Prima Paint and Buckeye distinguish between arguments challenging the
enforceability of the container contract and arguments directed at the arbitration
clause itself,75 Professor Rau questions whether they really mean it.  He argues
that Buckeye’s statement—“a challenge to the validity of the contract as a
whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitra-
tor”—is “an unfortunate turn of phrase, sloppy and unguarded.”76  In his view,
“it should be obvious that a challenge can be ‘to the arbitration clause itself’
without being ‘specifically to the arbitration provision.’”77  He gives, as exam-
ples, challenges alleging:
(1) “that the signature on a document was forged,”
514-15 (Tex. App. 2003) (arbitrators decide “dispute regarding whether a settlement agree-
ment was reached replacing or canceling” original agreement).
69 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967); accord Buck-
eye, 546 U.S. at 449 (“[A] challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not
specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.”).
70 See supra note 63 (discussing Nagrampa).
71 Or if the arbitrator hears them (as in First Options) the courts review them “indepen-
dently,” rather than under the deferential standard of review FAA section 10 requires courts
to use when reviewing an arbitrator’s decisions on matters properly before the arbitrator.
72 Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 444 n.1.
73 Rau, supra note 3, at 17.
74 Id.  The quoted language from Buckeye is also criticized as “slightly loose” by Adam
Samuel, Separability and the US Supreme Court Decision in Buckeye v. Cardegna, 22 ARB.
INT’L 477, 487 (2006).
75 See supra notes 18-20, 31 and accompanying text.
76 Rau, supra note 3, at 14 (emphasis omitted).
77 Id. (footnote omitted).
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(2) “that the signature was that of a corporation’s janitor with no authority
whatever,”
(3) “that the signature was induced by a representation that this piece of paper—
which turned out to be an agreement—was merely a receipt or an autograph,”
(4) “that one of the parties was mentally incompetent,”
(5) “that one of the parties was a minor.”78
In “none of these cases,” Professor Rau says, “is the challenge aimed ‘spe-
cifically’ at the arbitration clause,” but “it must be the court rather than the
arbitrator which is to pass on the challenge.”79  As he understands the separa-
bility doctrine, it “does not merely preserve for the courts challenges that are
‘restricted’ or ‘limited’ to ‘just’ the arbitration clause alone—this would be
senseless; it preserves for the courts any claim at all that necessarily calls an
agreement to arbitrate into question.”80
Professor Rau has published several articles on the separability doctrine,81
and has thought long and hard about the subject.82  By contrast, he says, “the
subject obviously sparked no intense interest” on the part of Justice Scalia, who
wrote the Court’s “short and perfunctory” opinion in Buckeye.83  So it is possi-
ble that Professor Rau’s thinking about separability is simply more advanced
than the Supreme Court’s because the Court has not thought about the separa-
bility doctrine any more than necessary to decide the cases that have come
before it.  If so, as the Court hears additional separability cases, its thinking
may catch up to Professor Rau’s and then the Court will adopt his approach.
One hint that this might occur is Buckeye’s treatment of capacity to con-
tract.  Incapacity has long been a defense to the enforcement of a contract
formed by a minor or mentally incompetent person.84  Such incapacity does not
78 Id. at 14-16.
79 Id. at 16.
80 Id.; see also Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About “Separability”
in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 17 (2003) [hereinafter Rau,
Seventeen Simple Propositions].
In the (relatively infrequent) cases where the party resisting arbitration calls into question his
assent to arbitrate, it will always be for a court to verify whether there has in fact been such
assent.  These cases will include
• the cases raising contract formation issues . . . ;
• the cases where “the particular challenge to the existence of the contract is such as necessarily
also to put the existence of the arbitration agreement in issue.” . . .
• the cases where the party resisting arbitration makes some attempt to identify “a defect in the
arbitration clause itself.”
Id. at 30.
81 Rau, supra note 3; Rau, Seventeen Simple Propositions, supra note 80; Alan Scott Rau,
“The Arbitrability Question Itself,” 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 287 (1999).
82 Perhaps he did not need to think hard about it.  Describing the separability doctrine,
Professor Rau said, “I don’t think that at bottom this really very difficult,” Rau, supra note 3,
at 27, and he has at least twice used the word “simple” to describe it.  First, he wrote an
article entitled Everything You Really Need to Know About “Separability” in Seventeen Sim-
ple Propositions, Rau, Seventeen Simple Propositions, supra note 80, at 4, and then a few
years later he said that “the whole architecture of ‘separability’ rests on just four simple
propositions.”  Rau, supra note 3, at 27.
83 Rau, supra note 3, at 14.
84 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 228-29 (3d ed. 1998).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ106.txt unknown Seq: 13 16-JAN-08 14:10
Fall 2007] ARBITRATION LAW’S SEPARABILITY DOCTRINE 119
prevent the formation of a contract.85  So under the Supreme Court’s distinc-
tion between a contract’s formation (“whether any agreement . . . was ever
concluded”) and defenses to enforcement (“the contract’s validity”), incapacity
plainly falls in the latter category and thus should be resolved by arbitrators
rather than courts.  Yet the Supreme Court in Buckeye grouped incapacity
together with lack of assent and agency, both of which fall into the former
category (formation) and both of which, First Options held, are resolved by
courts rather than arbitrators.86  So it is possible that—when presented with an
incapacity case—the Court will continue to group incapacity with lack of
assent and agency and treat them all as questions for courts, rather than arbitra-
tors, and thus join Professor Rau in rejecting the distinction between a con-
tract’s formation and defenses to its enforcement.87  Time will tell.
III. REPEAL THE SEPARABILITY DOCTRINE
A. The Separability Doctrine Is Incompatible with the Contractual
Approach to Arbitration Law
I have argued that the separability doctrine should be repealed because I
believe that no dispute should be sent to arbitration unless the parties have
formed an enforceable contract requiring arbitration of that dispute.88  Prior to
contracting, parties start with a right to litigate, rather than arbitrate, their dis-
85 Id.
86 See supra Part II.A (discussing First Options).
87 See Stephen K. Huber, The Arbitration Jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit:  Round IV, 39
TEX. TECH L. REV. 463, 471-78 (2007).
88 Stephen J. Ware, Interstate Arbitration:  Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, in
EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBI-
TRATION LAW IN AMERICA:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 88, 90-102 (2006) [hereinafter Ware,
Interstate Arbitration]; Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent,
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 128-38 (1996) [hereinafter Ware, Employment Arbitration].  The
related doctrine of competence-competence, at least as adopted by some countries, also vio-
lates the principle that a court should not send a dispute to arbitration unless the parties have
formed an enforceable contract requiring arbitration of that dispute.
The concept referred to as compétence-compétence (literally “jurisdiction concerning juris-
diction”) links together a constellation of disparate notions about when arbitrators can rule on the
limits of their own power.  In its simplest formulation, compétence-compétence means no more
than that arbitrators can look into their own jurisdiction without waiting for a court to do so.  In
other words, there is no need to stop arbitral proceedings to refer a jurisdictional issue to judges.
However, under this brand of compétence-compétence, the arbitrators’ determination about their
power would be subject to judicial review at any time, whether after an award is rendered or
when a motion is made to stay court proceedings or to compel arbitration.
French law goes further and delays court review of arbitral jurisdiction until after an award
is rendered.  If an arbitral tribunal has already begun to hear a matter, courts must decline to hear
the case.  When an arbitral tribunal has not yet been constituted, court litigation will go forward
only if the alleged arbitration agreement is clearly void (manifestement nulle).
William W. Park, Bridging the Gap in Forum Selection:  Harmonizing Arbitration and
Court Selection, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 46–47 (1998) (footnotes omit-
ted).  The French version of compétence-compétence may be inconsistent with the principle
that a court should not send a dispute to arbitration unless the parties have formed an
enforceable contract requiring arbitration of that dispute.  The French version is inconsistent
with this principle to the extent the French version prevents a court from considering chal-
lenges to an arbitration agreement’s existence or scope until after the arbitrator has done so.
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putes.  The right to litigate—access to a court of law—generally exists in the
international, as well as the domestic, context but may be of less practical value
internationally depending on the reliability of the court system(s) with jurisdic-
tion over the parties.89  In the domestic context, the right to litigate is basic to
our system of government and, with respect to many disputes, is a constitu-
tional right guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment and its counterparts in state
constitutions.90
The right to litigate is alienable.  A party can alienate it by forming an
arbitration agreement.91  Contemporary arbitration law generally makes the
right to litigate alienable through the standards of ordinary contract law, thus
treating the right to litigate like other rights that are alienable through con-
tract.92  Some critics of contemporary arbitration law contend that the right to
litigate is especially important so, they argue, it should only be alienable under
law requiring a higher standard of consent than is required by contract law.93
As an advocate of the contractual approach to arbitration law, I have defended
contemporary arbitration law from these critics.94  Now, in the following pages,
I defend the contractual approach to arbitration law against those who attack it
from the other direction; that is, those who argue that the right to litigate should
be alienable under a lower standard of consent than is found in contract law.
Who are these people?  They include most of the leading scholars of inter-
national arbitration and countless courts around the world, including the United
States Supreme Court.95  They are the advocates of the separability doctrine.
The separability doctrine makes the right to litigate alienable under a lower
standard of consent than is found in contract law.  It does so by removing from
the right to litigate the protection provided by contract law’s defenses to
By contrast, the simple version of competence-competence (in the first quoted para-
graph) is consistent with the principle.  Also consistent with this principle is court enforce-
ment of agreements submitting to the arbitrator the power to decide the arbitrator’s
jurisdiction.  Such enforcement is blessed by First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 946-47 (1995), and AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of
America, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986).  On the other hand, if the parties dispute whether their
agreement does submit to the arbitrator the power to decide the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, then
a court must resolve that dispute or it risks sending a dispute to arbitration even though the
parties have not formed an enforceable contract requiring arbitration of that dispute.
89 See infra notes 143-146 and accompanying text.
90 Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 169 (2004).
91 Id.; see also Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law, 29
MCGEORGE L. REV. 195 (1998) [hereinafter Ware, Consumer Arbitration].
The particular rights [contemporary arbitration law] makes alienable are those enforced in court,
but not (necessarily) in arbitration.  These include rights specified by rules of civil procedure and
evidence, and the right to a government-selected adjudicator (judge or jury) to decide questions
of fact.  I shall refer to this set of rights as the “right to government adjudication.”  An enforcea-
ble arbitration agreement alienates this right to government adjudication and creates, instead, a
right to private adjudication.
Id. at 209 (footnotes omitted).
92 Ware, supra note 90, at 170-72.
93 Id. at 172-74 (citing critics of contractual approach).
94 Ware, Consumer Arbitration, supra note 91; Ware, supra note 90.
95 Internationally, “the separability doctrine is widely accepted in most jurisdictions.”
BORN, supra note 22, at 67 (citing authority).
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enforcement.  Under the contractual approach to arbitration law, the right to
litigate (like other rights) would be alienable through an enforceable contract,
but not a contract that is unenforceable due to misrepresentation, duress, ille-
gality, or any other contract-law defense.  By contrast, the separability doctrine
holds that a party alienates its right to litigate when that party forms a contract
containing an arbitration clause even if that contract is unenforceable.  For
example, if F&C did, in fact, fraudulently induce Prima Paint to sign the con-
sulting agreement, then the Supreme Court deprived Prima Paint of its right to
litigate even though Prima Paint did not form an enforceable contract to arbi-
trate.  The separability doctrine separates arbitration law from an important part
of contract law—the defenses to enforcement—and thus fails to provide the
right to litigate with the protection of those defenses.
The only way to fix this problem is to repeal the separability doctrine and
allow courts to hear defenses to the enforcement of the contract containing the
arbitration clause.  Courts should send cases to arbitration only after rejecting
any such defenses.  This repeal of the separability doctrine can be accom-
plished in the United States by changing the wording of FAA section 4.96
Instead of section 4 sending cases to arbitration when the court is “satisfied that
the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue,” a revised
section 4 should send cases to arbitration when the court is “satisfied that the
making of the contract containing the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in
issue.”97
B. Consent-Based Arguments for the Separability Doctrine
1. Professor Rau and the Gunpoint Example
The previous subsection of this article argued that the separability doctrine
should be repealed because it deprives the right to litigate of the protection
provided by contract defenses and thus separates arbitration law from an impor-
tant part of contract law.  The injustice of the separability doctrine is high-
lighted by the hypothetical case of an individual who signs an arbitration
96 No change in the wording of FAA section 3 is necessary because Prima Paint held that
the procedures of section 4 also apply to stay motions under section 3.  Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).  With respect to international arbitra-
tion, scholars disagree about whether the New York Convention adopts the separability doc-
trine or leaves it to national law. Compare ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION OF 1958:  TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 145-46 (1981)
(Convention is “indifferent” as to existence of separability doctrine), with STEPHEN M.
SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:  THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS 22 (1987) (Conven-
tion adopts separability doctrine “by implication”).
97 Under this anti-separability procedure I propose here:
(1) Courts would continue to rule, as they currently do, on defenses focused only on the
arbitration clause, e.g., an argument that only the arbitration clause is unconscionable.
Although such challenges focus only on the arbitration clause, they are arguments that the
contract containing the arbitration clause is unenforceable;
(2) Arbitrators would continue to rule, as they currently do, on defenses that do not relate
to the making of the container contract.  Such defenses include impracticability, frustration
of purpose, the statute of limitations, material breach, and termination of the contract.
Defenses that relate to the making of the container contract include misrepresentation, mis-
take, duress, undue influence, incapacity, unconscionability, the statute of frauds, and
illegality.
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agreement with a gun to her head.  If an arbitration claim is brought against this
individual and she moves the court to stay arbitration on the ground that “the
making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is . . . in issue,”98 the separability
doctrine requires the court to deny her motion and compel arbitration.  As
Buckeye stated, “a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not
specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.”99  In the gun-
point example, the individual’s challenge, duress, is plainly a challenge to the
validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause.
Thus application of the separability doctrine to this case deprives the individ-
ual’s right to litigate of the protection provided by contract defenses, here, the
defense of duress.
Alan Scott Rau disagrees.  As noted above, he thinks the just-quoted lan-
guage from Buckeye was merely “an unfortunate turn of phrase, sloppy and
unguarded.”100  In his view, “it should be obvious that a challenge can be ‘to
the arbitration clause itself’ without being ‘specifically to the arbitration provi-
sion.’”101  He believes the separability doctrine, properly understood, would
send the duress argument in the gunpoint example to the court, rather than the
arbitrator.102  Of course, I hope his prediction is correct.
Where Professor Rau and I disagree is whether the separability doctrine
ought to treat the contract defense of duress (as in the gunpoint example) differ-
ently from other contract defenses, such as the contract defense of misrepresen-
tation (as in Prima Paint).  Professor Rau would distinguish between Prima
Paint and the gunpoint example, sending the misrepresentation claim to arbitra-
tion, while allowing a court to hear the duress claim.  His basis for this distinc-
tion is that he would send to “the courts any claim at all that necessarily calls an
agreement to arbitrate into question.”103
But how does one determine whether a particular claim “necessarily calls
an agreement to arbitrate into question”?  Professor Rau would send the mis-
representation claim to arbitration because he does not believe F&C’s alleged
misrepresentation about its financial condition necessarily calls into question
Prima Paint’s agreement to arbitrate.104  By contrast, he has stated that “[t]here
98 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
99 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006).
100 Rau, supra note 3, at 14.
101 Id. (footnote omitted).
102 Id. at 31.
103 Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted).
104 “Prima Paint . . . preserves for the courts any claim at all that necessarily calls an
agreement to arbitrate into question.”  Rau, Seventeen Simple Propositions, supra note 80, at
17 (emphasis omitted).  “However, quite often the unenforceability of the container agree-
ment need not affect the validity of the consent to arbitrate at all.” Id. at 18 (emphasis
omitted).  In Prima Paint,
[a] number of representations had inevitably been made by F&C on which Prima Paint relied by
entering into the deal—representations, for example, concerning the current list of F&C custom-
ers whose patronage was to be taken over by the successor company, and the financial ability of
F&C to perform its contractual obligations.  Both parties, represented by counsel, certainly
understood that these representations were material to Prima Paint; they also understood that
should any of them turn out to be false, Prima Paint might ultimately be entitled to seek rescis-
sion and perhaps even the recovery of damages.  The parties might also have been aware that the
falsity of any representations—and whether any falsehoods were intentional—might turn out to
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is simply no agreement to anything, for example, where a signature has been
forged, or where an authentic signature was obtained at gunpoint.”105
While this is true with respect to forgery,106 it is not with respect to the
signature obtained at gunpoint.  The individual who signs with a gun to her
head does agree to arbitration, she does manifest assent to the terms on the
document she is signing; however, she does so under circumstances in which
the law properly declines to enforce her agreement.  Just as when she signs a
container contract in reliance on a misrepresentation regarding, say, F&C’s
financial condition, she does agree to arbitration, but she does so under circum-
stances in which the law properly declines to enforce her agreement.107
require difficult factual inquiries.  Is it not perfectly plausible under these circumstances that they
might have chosen to submit to arbitration—not only questions with respect to the quality of
F&C’s performance—but also questions with respect to whether F&C had misrepresented the
quality of its performance?
. . .
Now if we can imagine reasons why the parties might have wished to extend arbitral juris-
diction so far—and if we think they did so—then concerns about the “validity” of the underlying
agreement become completely irrelevant.  In such a case, deference to the parties’ choice means
that the defense—whether of misrepresentation, or indefiniteness, or frustration—is not some-
thing with which a court need concern itself.
Id. at 18-20.
105 Id. at 14 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Alan Scott Rau, The New York Convention in
American Courts, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 213, 253 n.173 (1996)).
106 The Supreme Court cases discussed above indicate that forgery arguments, like other
arguments that no container contract was formed, should be heard by the court, rather than
the arbitrator. See supra Part II.
107 This is why the separability doctrine cannot be defended on the ground that it is a
“default rule.” See Richard E. Speidel, International Commercial Arbitration:  Implement-
ing the New York Convention, in EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STER-
NLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA:  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
185, 260 n.284 (2006) (characterizing the separability doctrine as a “default rule”); Barceló
III, supra note 22, at 1119-22 (2003) (same); Rau, supra note 3, at 4 (same); see also BORN,
supra note 22, at 73 (using the phrase “separability presumption” rather than default rule, but
apparently to the same effect).  A default rule is a rule that governs in the absence of an
enforceable contract term to the contrary.  Rules about what constitutes an enforceable con-
tract cannot be default rules because they are logically prior to the concept of “default rule.”
See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:  An Economic The-
ory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 119-20 (1989) (“[B]efore implementing any default
standard, courts need to establish, as a logically prior matter, rules for deciding . . . what is
sufficient to contract around a default.”).  Characterizing the separability doctrine as a
default rule begs the very question at issue:  Why should an unenforceable contract be suffi-
cient to contract around the default rule that disputes are litigated rather than arbitrated,
when the law ordinarily requires an enforceable contract to contract around other default
rules? See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999).
The only way parties could “contract around” the “law on contracting around” would be to form
a contract specifying the requirements for forming later contracts among them.  The original
contract though, would have to be governed by mandatory rules on the formation of enforceable
contracts.  The mandatory rules specifying the requirements for forming an enforceable contract
differ from other mandatory rules in that the former must, as a matter of logic, be mandatory.
Id. at 750.  For example, suppose that parties X and Y form two contracts a year apart, and
in the second contract there is no arbitration clause, but in the first contract there is a clause
providing for arbitration, not only of disputes arising out of that contract, but also disputes
arising out of any later contracts between the parties.  What if X and Y have a dispute about
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In this regard, the case of the signature at gunpoint is different from the
example in which “A grasps B’s hand and compels B by physical force to write
his name” on the signature line of a contract containing an arbitration clause.108
As the current Restatement of Contracts says, “B’s signature is not effective as
a manifestation of his assent, and there is no contract.”109  By contrast to this
example, in which there is no contract because there is no agreement, the signa-
ture obtained at gunpoint is an agreement, albeit one induced by an improper
threat, and there is a contract, albeit one voidable at the option of the victim.
The Restatement treats the A-grasps-B’s-hand example in its section 174 and
the gunpoint example in its section 175 for good reason; they are conceptually
quite distinct, with the A-grasps-B’s-hand example far more analogous to fraud
in the factum and the gunpoint example far more analogous to the sort of fraud
alleged in Prima Paint, fraud in the inducement.110  In the A-grasps-B’s-hand
example and in fraud in the factum, there is no agreement.  In the gunpoint
example, as in Prima Paint, there is an agreement.
This foray into the doctrinal nuances of contract defenses is important
because it cuts against Professor Rau’s view that there is less of an agreement
to arbitration in the gunpoint example than in a fraud-in-the-inducement case
like Prima Paint.  It thus undermines Professor Rau’s contention that he can
reconcile his preferred results in Prima Paint (arbitrator hears misrepresenta-
tion defense) and the gunpoint example (court hears duress defense) with his
principle that would send to “the courts any claim at all that necessarily calls an
agreement to arbitrate into question.”111  I believe consistency requires Profes-
sor Rau to abandon that principle or change sides on either Prima Paint or the
gunpoint example.  I hope he changes sides on Prima Paint.
The gunpoint example has been the subject of a long and (I think) friendly
and respectful exchange between Professor Rau and me.  I first used the exam-
ple in 1996.112  Professor Rau’s first published reply was, “There is simply no
agreement to anything, for example, where a signature has been forged, or
where an authentic signature was obtained at gunpoint.”113  Returning to the
gunpoint example a few years later, he added, “[N]o court that understood the
consensual basis of Prima Paint could ever dream of sending such a dispute to
arbitration.”114  Then, in 2003, he said that he was “exceedingly puzzled” by
my assertion that the separability doctrine requires courts to send the gunpoint
the second contract and whether X fraudulently induced Y to enter the second contract?
Each party should have the duty to arbitrate that dispute because Y has alleged a misrepre-
sentation defense only to the second contract, but not to the first contract, the one through
which Y assumed the duty to arbitrate.
Parties who want to contract around the anti-separability doctrine proposed in this arti-
cle should follow this procedure.  They should enter a truly separate contract.
108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1981).
109 Id.
110 See id. §§ 163-64 (distinguishing between misrepresentation that prevents formation of a
contract and misrepresentation that makes a contract voidable).
111 Rau, supra note 3, at 16 (emphasis omitted).
112 Ware, Employment Arbitration, supra note 88, at 134-35.
113 Alan Scott Rau, The New York Convention in American Courts, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
213, 253 n.173 (1996) (emphasis omitted).
114 Rau, supra note 81, at 336 n.129.
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case to arbitration,115 and he reiterated his statement that “[t]here is simply no
agreement to anything, for example, where a signature has been forged, or
where an authentic signature was obtained at gunpoint.”116
After a decade of holding my fire, in 2006, I returned to the gunpoint
example and published an argument, which (like this article) contrasted the
gunpoint example with the A-grasps-B’s-hand example and concluded that
“[i]n the gunpoint example, as in Prima Paint, there is an agreement.”117  That
same year, Professor Rau also returned to the gunpoint example, but with a
changed view.  Rather than sticking for a third time with his previously-
expressed view that “there is simply no agreement to anything” in the gunpoint
example, Professor Rau’s 2006 article says:
Consider the inevitable chestnut—I’m afraid I can’t find an actual example of this in
the reports—of the agreement (arbitration clause included) entered into at gunpoint
under threat of having one’s brains blown out.  I have no idea whether the rather
dicey nature of the “consent” given here would render the overall contract “void,” or
“voidable,” or “nonexistent”—and while greater minds than mine have dwelled on
the issue, for my part I really don’t much care.  As usual, the verbal formulation
hardly matters.  But surely nothing in the Court’s opinion in [Buckeye] warrants any
deference whatever—prospective or retrospective—to the decision of any individual
in such a case who purports to act as an “arbitrator.”118
I applaud Professor Rau’s movement from the view that “there is simply
no agreement to anything” in the gunpoint example to the view that the consent
given in that example is “rather dicey.”  I credit Professor Rau (perhaps alone
among separability advocates119) for repeatedly engaging with my contention
that the separability doctrine cannot accommodate a principled distinction
between the gunpoint example and a misrepresentation case like Prima Paint.
The challenge for Professor Rau remains how he can reconcile his preferred
115 Rau, Seventeen Simple Propositions, supra note 80, at 15 n.40.
116 Id. at 14 (emphasis omitted).
117 Ware, Interstate Arbitration, supra note 88, at 101.
118 Rau, supra note 3, at 31 (footnotes omitted).  The “greater minds” cited are the drafters
of the Uniform Commercial Code and Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
119 Professor Park writes:
One occasionally hears scholarly attacks on separability suggesting that the doctrine facilitates
enforcement of agreements that are unconscionable or not based on informed consent.
Properly understood, however, separability should not prevent a party from resisting arbitra-
tion on the grounds of duress, unconscionability, lack of informed consent or arbitrator excess of
authority.  Notwithstanding the separability doctrine, courts can and do refuse to enforce an
arbitration agreement tainted by duress, unconscionability, or a signatory’s lack of authority,
which render the clause itself void, voidable or otherwise inoperative.
William W. Park, Arbitration in Banking and Finance, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 213, 271-
72 (1998) (footnote omitted).  Unlike Professor Rau, whose argument for distinguishing
between duress and misrepresentation is addressed in the text, Professor Park provides no
argument for his view that the separability doctrine should apply to misrepresentation but not
duress.  Nor does Professor Park cite any authority for the proposition that courts, in fact,
“refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement tainted by duress.”  For contrary authority, see
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 1981)
(sending to arbitrator claims of duress and undue influence); Serv. Corp. Int’l v. Lopez, 162
S.W.3d 801, 810 (Tex. App. 2005) (The “duress . . . issue relates to the contract as a whole
and not solely the arbitration provision.  It is therefore an issue to be decided in
arbitration.”).
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outcomes in those two cases with his principle of sending to “the courts any
claim at all that necessarily calls an agreement to arbitrate into question.”120
Professor Rau acknowledges that the circumstances surrounding the agree-
ment in the gunpoint example make the consent given “rather dicey.”121  Why
isn’t the consent given in Prima Paint equally “dicey”?  Why is consent more
“dicey” in a duress case than a misrepresentation case?  What are the “dicey-
ness” criteria courts should use in deciding what arguments ought to be sent to
arbitrators?
Trying to identify such criteria would be like reinventing the wheel.122
The common law of contracts has, over centuries, developed doctrines (like
misrepresentation and duress) to serve precisely this purpose of describing cir-
cumstances that deprive consent of “its normal moral, and therefore legal, sig-
nificance.”123  Why not use the accumulated wisdom embodied in those
doctrines?  Doing so requires only that courts apply these doctrines to contracts
containing arbitration clauses in the same way courts already apply them to
other contracts.  Again, the problem with the separability doctrine is that it
separates arbitration law from an important part of contract law, the defenses to
enforcement.  It thus deprives the right to litigate of the protection provided by
those defenses and thus makes the right to litigate alienable under lower stan-
dards of consent than contract law provides for the alienation of other rights.
For this reason, I continue to believe the separability doctrine should be
repealed.
2. A Limited Separability Doctrine Compatible with Contract Law?
Although I am not sure I see it in Professor Rau’s writings, I think he has a
reply to my question of why the consent given in a misrepresentation case (like
Prima Paint) is less “dicey” than the consent given in the gunpoint example.  I
think his reply is that when one signs a document with a gun to one’s head the
duress eliminates the moral significance of one’s consent to all of the terms on
the document, whereas when one signs a document induced by a misrepresenta-
tion about F&C’s financial condition the misrepresentation only eliminates the
moral significance of one’s consent to the terms relating to F&C’s financial
condition.  In other words, the party who signs with a gun to her head alleges
duress with respect to all of the contract’s terms, while Prima Paint’s allegation
was that F&C only made a misrepresentation with respect to some of the con-
tract’s terms.124  Perhaps this is what Professor Rau means when he says that
“there is simply no agreement to anything” in the gunpoint example while in
Prima Paint it is “perfectly plausible . . . that [F&C and Prima Paint] might
have chosen to submit to arbitration—not only questions with respect to the
120 Rau, supra note 3, at 16 (emphasis omitted).
121 Id. at 31.
122 Ware, Employment Arbitration, supra note 88, at 112 n.138.
123 Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 318 (1986)
(“Traditional contract defenses can be understood as describing circumstances that, if proved
to have existed, deprive the manifestation of assent of its normal moral, and therefore legal,
significance.”).
124 Similar to Prima Paint, Cardegna’s allegation in Buckeye was that only some of the
contract’s terms were illegal.
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quality of F&C’s performance—but also questions with respect to whether
F&C had misrepresented the quality of its performance.”125  Perhaps Professor
Rau and I could agree on a separability doctrine that distinguishes between
contract defenses that prevent enforcement of all the contract’s terms and con-
tract defenses that only prevent enforcement of some of the contract’s terms.
Courts would rule on the former while arbitrators would rule on the latter.  This
would confine the separability doctrine to defenses that do not (under contract
law) necessarily prevent enforcement of all of the contract’s terms.126  Thus
enforcing the arbitration clause (and perhaps other clauses) notwithstanding the
assertion of such a defense would be consistent with contract law outside the
arbitration context.  This limited separability doctrine would meet my goal of
harmonizing arbitration law with contract law and thus providing the right to
litigate with the same protection contract law provides other rights.
In contract law outside the arbitration context, for example, if a particular
term of a contract is unconscionable, “a court may refuse to enforce the con-
tract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
term.”127  If the court chooses the latter option then it is holding that the
defense to enforcement (unconscionability) only prevents enforcement of some
of the contract’s terms, rather than all of its terms.  What has just been said
about unconscionable terms is also true of terms unenforceable due to public
policy.
If the parties’ performances can be apportioned into corresponding pairs of part per-
formances so that the parts of each pair are properly regarded as agreed equivalents
and one pair is not offensive to public policy, that portion of the agreement is
enforceable by a party who did not engage in serious misconduct.128
So the public policy (or illegality) doctrine, like the unconscionability doctrine,
sometimes treats a defense as only preventing enforcement of some of the con-
tract’s terms, rather than all of the contract’s terms.  Thus, the limited separa-
bility doctrine described here would permit courts to continue sending to
arbitrators arguments that the container contract is unenforceable due to public
policy or unconscionability.
By contrast, my research revealed no cases in which courts held that a
misrepresentation only prevented enforcement of some of the contract’s terms
when the victim of the misrepresentation sought to prevent enforcement of all
the contract’s terms.129  Courts seem united in holding that the victim of a
misrepresentation may make the entire contract voidable.  In fact, one court
expressly rejected the argument that misrepresentation should only prevent
enforcement of some of the contract’s terms.
Since a divisible contract is still only a single contract, the customary rules
regarding contract formation are applicable.  Those rules provide that a contract
125 Rau, Seventeen Simple Propositions, supra note 80, at 18 (emphasis omitted).
126 As noted above, I believe arbitrators should continue to rule on defenses that do not
relate to the making of the container contract. See supra note 97.  This is so even with
respect to such defenses that prevent enforcement of all the contract’s terms.
127 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
128 Id. § 183; see also id. § 184(1).
129 If the victim of the misrepresentation wants to avoid only some of the contract’s terms,
the court may allow it when the contract is divisible. See id. § 383 cmt. b.
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induced by fraud renders the entire agreement voidable . . . .  Since the jury here
found that the Contract was induced by misrepresentations made with the intent to
defraud cross-complainants, the Contract, whether divisible or not, was voidable.
FMI’s action to collect on it could thus be defended on the ground that the Contract
had been procured by fraud.
. . .
Any other conclusion would be anomalous since even a party simply breaching
a divisible portion of a contract could not enforce its unperformed portions that he or
she did not breach.  (Rest.2d Contracts, § 240, com. b.)  Similarly, a party who has
defrauded another into entering a portion of a divisible contract can not enforce the
other parts not so induced.  We have found no authority, and none has been cited to
us, permitting a defrauder to enforce the balance of a divisible contract not induced
by fraud.130
In sum, contract law outside the arbitration (and other dispute-resolu-
tion131) context seems to treat misrepresentation (like duress) as a defense that
(if proven) makes all the terms of the contract unenforceable, while treating
unconscionability and public policy as defenses that (if proven) could make
some or all of the terms unenforceable.  Similarly, a limited separability doc-
trine would have a court rule on defenses to contract enforcement that prevent
enforcement of all the contract’s terms while enforcing the arbitration clause to
have the arbitrator rule on defenses to contract enforcement that only prevent
enforcement of some of the contract’s terms.132  This limited separability doc-
trine would treat arbitration clauses no different from other terms of the con-
tract and thus provide the right to litigate with the same protection contract law
provides other rights.
C. Other Arguments for the Separability Doctrine
1. Arguments Applicable to Both Domestic and International
Arbitration
The previous subsection of this article responds to Professor Rau’s con-
sent-based argument for the separability doctrine.  This subsection responds to
other arguments by separability advocates, most of which emphasize the doc-
trine’s purported importance to arbitration.133  For example, it is commonly
said that the separability doctrine “permits arbitrators to invalidate the main
contract (e.g., for illegality or fraud in the inducement) without the risk that
their decision will call into question the validity of the arbitration clause from
130 Filet Menu, Inc. v. C.C.L. & G., Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 444 (Ct. App. 2000).
131 The separability doctrine is applied to misrepresentation with respect to choice of law
clauses, as well as arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Rio Props., Inc. v. Stewart Annoyances,
Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1131-32 (D. Nev. 2006); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 201 cmt. c (1971).
132 Unless, of course, the arbitration clause is among the contract’s terms made unenforce-
able by the defense, such as an unconscionable arbitration clause.
133 Rau, Seventeen Simple Propositions, supra note 80, at 82 n.197; Adam Samuel, Stephen
M. Schwebel, International Arbitration:  Three Salient Problems, 5 J. INT’L ARB. 119, 120
(1988) (book review) (“Schwebel starts by setting out the justifications for the separability
doctrine.  He rightly points out that it is designed to reduce court interference in the arbitral
process and the arbitrator’s decision on the merits.”).
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which they derive their power.”134  Suppose, for example, that when Prima
Paint receives F&C’s demand for arbitration, Prima Paint decides not to go to
court to allege F&C’s fraudulent inducement, but instead complies with F&C’s
demand to submit the case to arbitration.  In other words, suppose that Prima
Paint participates in arbitration without ever addressing explicitly whether the
arbitrator has jurisdiction to decide whether Prima Paint formed an enforceable
contract containing an arbitration clause.  Prima Paint’s participation in arbitra-
tion consists solely of arguing the merits, that is, arguing that the contract it
formed was unenforceable due to F&C’s misrepresentation.  Suppose further
that the arbitrator concludes that F&C fraudulently induced Prima Paint to sign
the consulting agreement so the arbitrator issues an award rejecting F&C’s
claim for payment from Prima Paint and even awarding damages to Prima
Paint.  The separability doctrine’s advocates seem to worry that—without the
doctrine—this arbitration award in favor of Prima Paint would have no legal
force (that is, could not be confirmed and enforced by a court) because the
arbitrator’s only power to render the award came from a contract, the consult-
ing agreement, that the arbitrator held unenforceable.
In fact, however, the arbitrator’s power came, not just from the consulting
agreement, but also from a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate.  When (in the
hypothetical) F&C demanded arbitration and Prima Paint complied with that
demand by participating in arbitration, the parties formed a post-dispute agree-
ment to arbitrate.  The agreement was formed, not by mutual assent to a writ-
ing, but by conduct.  By arguing the merits to the arbitrator, without
questioning the arbitrator’s jurisdiction to decide the merits, Prima Paint con-
ferred that jurisdiction on the arbitrator, that is, Prima Paint agreed to arbitrate
the merits.  More importantly, this post-dispute agreement is not an executory
agreement, but rather one that has been performed; both sides participated in
the arbitration and the arbitrator rendered an award.  What could be the ground
for vacating such an award?  None of the grounds for vacatur in the FAA
would be satisfied.135  And even before enactment of the FAA, when courts
generally refused to enforce executory arbitration agreements, they did enforce
arbitration awards.136  It is unlikely a contemporary court would refuse to
enforce an arbitration award—rendered after both sides manifested assent to
arbitration by participating in it—on the ground that the arbitrators deprived
134 William W. Park, Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction:  Allocation of Tasks Between
Courts and Arbitrators, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 133, 143 (1997); see also BORN, supra note
22, at 68 (“Another possible consequence of the separability doctrine is that, if an arbitral
tribunal or court concludes that the parties’ entire underlying contract was void, that conclu-
sion would not necessarily deprive the parties’ arbitration agreement—and hence, in a
Catch-22 turn, the arbitrators’ award—of validity.”); Robert H. Smit, Separability and Com-
petence-Competence in International Arbitration:  Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit?  Or Can Something
Come from Nothing?, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 19, 20-21 (2002) (“[S]eparability means that
. . . a party’s challenge to the validity of the underlying contract does not automatically
deprive the arbitral tribunal of jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ dispute concerning the
challenged contract.”).
135 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000).
136 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW:  AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT ch. 4 (1994); see also IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW:  REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION
19 (1992).
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themselves of the power to render the award by the very act of rendering it, that
is, holding that the container contract is unenforceable.137  So the separability
doctrine is not necessary to avoid that unfortunate quandary.
Perhaps in response to such arguments, one of the separability doctrine’s
prominent advocates, William Park, writes:
Occasionally one hears suggestions that an estoppel doctrine could achieve the same
goal [as the separability doctrine], by deeming a party who participated in the arbitra-
tion to have waived the right to challenge the award.  Such an approach, however,
would not deal adequately with the common situation in which an arbitrator rules on
several claims and/or counterclaims, but has jurisdiction only over some of them.
Moreover, an estoppel or waiver doctrine would likely encourage boycott of arbitral
proceedings.138
137 It is true that both the FAA and the New York Convention require a written arbitration
agreement for a court to confirm an arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C. § 13 (2000) (stating that
the party moving for an order confirming an award shall file the arbitration agreement);
United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 4, § 1(b), June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.  But contemporary courts are likely to hold that parties who
participate in arbitration without questioning the arbitrator’s jurisdiction are estopped from
relying on the absence of a written agreement to arbitrate. See Slaney v. Int’l Amateur
Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001).
Assuming that this case had come to the district court and the IAAF had sought to compel
Slaney to arbitrate her claims, a determination as to whether there had been a writing might pose
a barrier to the IAAF’s position.  However, that is not the case.  Here, an arbitration has already
taken place in which, as we have determined, Slaney freely participated.  Thus, the fact that
Slaney suggests there is no written agreement to arbitrate, as mandated by Article II of the New
York Convention is irrelevant. See e.g., Coutinho Caro & Co., U.S.A., Inc. v. Marcus Trading
Inc., Nos. 3:95CV2362 AWT, 3:96CV2218 AWT, 3:96CV2219 AWT, 2000 WL 435566 at *5
n.4 (D. Conn. March 14, 2000) (recognizing a difference between the situation where a party
seeks to compel arbitration and a situation in which one attempts to set aside an arbitral award
that has already been issued).  What is highlighted here is the difference between Article II of the
Convention, which dictates when a court should compel parties to an arbitration, and Article V,
which lists the narrow circumstances in which an arbitration decision between signatories to the
Convention should not be enforced.
Id. at 591.  “The [Slaney] court went on to apply ordinary rules of contract law in holding
that the plaintiff was estopped from arguing that the lack of a binding written agreement
precluded enforcement because she had participated freely in the arbitration proceeding, had
not argued that she never agreed to the arbitration clause during those proceedings, and had
let the opportunity to do so pass by when she withdrew from those proceedings.”  China
Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 284 (3d Cir. 2003);
see also id. at 285 n.11 (reconciling Slaney with First Options).  Any doubt about whether
all courts would use Slaney’s estoppel reasoning counsels for repeal of the language in the
FAA and New York Convention requiring a written arbitration agreement for confirmation
of an arbitration award. See JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL ARBITRATION (2003).
Many modern arbitration laws consider any participation in proceedings on the merits with-
out challenging the jurisdiction of the tribunal as a submission to arbitration.  For example, Arti-
cle 16(2) [UNCITRAL] Model Law [on International Commercial Arbitration] provides that any
objection to the jurisdiction of an arbitration tribunal has to be raised no later than the statement
of defence.  After this time there is a deemed acceptance of the arbitration and a later challenge
to jurisdiction would be estopped.
Id. at 330-31.
138 Park, supra note 119, at 270 n.224.
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Whether the arbitrator has jurisdiction over some or all claims is deter-
mined by interpreting the agreement submitting the dispute to arbitration.139  In
the case of an agreement formed by conduct, rather than assent to a writing, the
parties take the risk that the arbitrator and any reviewing court will interpret the
agreement to give the arbitrator jurisdiction over all claims the arbitrator
thought to rule on.  If a party does not like that risk then it should not partici-
pate in arbitration without a written agreement specifying which claims are, and
are not, being submitted to the arbitrator.140  Similarly, in the absence of the
separability doctrine, a party who does not want to comply with the arbitrator’s
rulings on challenges to the enforceability of the container contract should not
participate in arbitration until a court rules on such challenges.141  If this is
what Professor Park calls “encourag[ing] boycott of arbitral proceedings,” then
such encouragement is positive.  After all, it ensures that parties who want a
court to rule on the enforceability of the container contract get such a ruling142
and rightly allocates to parties who go to arbitration without such a ruling the
consequences of leaving the question to the arbitrator.
2. Arguments Applicable to International Arbitration Only
In the international arbitration context, some argue, the previous para-
graph’s reasoning does not apply “[f]or normally there is no international court
with compulsory jurisdiction to determine and enforce the validity of the inter-
139 First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); AT&T Techs., Inc. v.
Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
140 Such agreements are, in arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce,
called “Terms of Reference.” See W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE ARBITRATION (3d ed. 2000).
Even if no longer necessary to ensure compliance with national procedural laws requiring a
compromis [post-dispute arbitration agreement], the preparation of the Terms of Reference at the
outset of the proceeding clarifies the issues to be decided by the arbitrators and the rules and
powers they are to use in conducting the case.  The existence of such a document further serves
as a protection against attacks on an award on the grounds that the arbitrators had exceeded their
authority or had ruled on issues not submitted to them.
Id. at 274.
141 First Options, 514 U.S. at 946-47, can be read to the contrary.  However, the facts of
First Options differ in an important respect from the hypothetical facts discussed in the text.
In the hypothetical, Prima Paint’s participation in arbitration (arguing the merits of the case
without questioning the arbitrator’s jurisdiction to decide the merits) is a manifestation of
assent to the arbitrator deciding, among other things, whether Prima Paint formed an
enforceable contract containing an arbitration clause.  In First Options, by contrast, the
Kaplans’ participation in arbitration consisted primarily of arguing that they had never mani-
fested assent to the arbitrator deciding whether they had formed an enforceable contract to
arbitrate. Id.  Thus First Options’ holding that the Kaplans’ participation in arbitration did
not constitute a waiver of the right to have a court decide whether they had formed an
enforceable contract to arbitrate can be reconciled with a holding in the hypothetical that
Prima Paint has waived its right to have a court decide whether it had formed an enforceable
contract to arbitrate.  That said, under the anti-separability doctrine I propose, the safer
course for those in the Kaplans’ position is to stay out of arbitration because any participa-
tion in arbitration could be (mis?)interpreted by a court as waiver of the right to have a court
decide whether an enforceable contract to arbitrate was formed.
142 It thus vindicates the principle that a court should not send a dispute to arbitration unless
the parties have formed an enforceable contract requiring arbitration of that dispute. See
supra Part III.A.
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national [arbitration] agreement.”143  But the national court of the party oppos-
ing arbitration has likely jurisdiction over that party.144
The separability doctrine’s advocates’ likely worry is that that national
court would be biased in favor of the party opposing arbitration and thus refuse
to enforce an executory arbitration agreement that it really should enforce.  But
avoiding that biased court at the stage of enforcing an executory arbitration
agreement does no good if that same biased court can later prevent enforcement
of an arbitration award against its preferred party.
In some cases, of course, a biased court cannot prevent enforcement of an
arbitration award because, for example, the assets necessary to satisfy the
award are outside that court’s jurisdiction and within the jurisdiction of a court
willing to enforce the award (the “good court”).  But if the good court is willing
to defy the biased court at the award-enforcement stage, it should also be will-
ing to defy the biased court at the executory-agreement stage.145  Ultimately,
whether international arbitration decisions are more than hortatory turns on
whether good courts are willing and able to enforce such decisions, not whether
courts get involved only at the end of the process (as required by the separabil-
ity doctrine) or also earlier (as would sometimes occur without the separability
doctrine).146
IV. CONCLUSION
While I believe this article refutes many of the common arguments for the
separability doctrine, I concede that the “anti-separability” rule I propose has
downsides.  Having a court available to resolve disputes over whether the par-
ties have formed an enforceable container contract (before an arbitrator
resolves the merits of the claims) would add an extra procedural step that
would often make arbitration slower and costlier than it is under the separabil-
ity doctrine, which resolves in one forum disputes about both the enforceability
of the container contract and the merits.147  In addition, this anti-separability
143 SCHWEBEL, supra note 96, at 4.
144 Otherwise, how would that party have access to any court system?
145 The good court’s standards of personal jurisdiction may, however, be more stringent at
the executory-agreement stage than the award-enfocement stage. See William W. Park &
Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and National Law:  Emerging Conflicts in Interna-
tional Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 251, 268-84 (2006) (discussing split of authority among
courts in the United States).
146 The reasoning in the text also responds to other arguments for the separability doctrine
in the international context.  An example is the argument that in cases
in which the agreement runs not between two persons or companies of different nationality but
between a foreign contractor and a government, not only would the contractor be loath to seek
enforcement of his arbitral remedy [enforcement of the executory arbitration agreement] in
national courts; often national courts would lack the authority to require the executive branch to
arbitrate contrary to its will, its executive order or national legislation.
SCHWEBEL, supra note 96, at 4.  Again, whether international arbitration decisions are more
than hortatory turns on whether good courts are willing and able to enforce such decisions,
not whether courts get involved only at the end of the process (as required by the separability
doctrine) or also earlier.
147 The anti-separability procedure would allow a party who expects to lose in arbitration to
delay arbitration by fabricating an allegation that the container contract is unenforceable.
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procedure would have a court resolving issues that will often be intertwined
with the merits that will go to the arbitrator if the court finds that the parties
have formed an enforceable container contract.148  In short, repealing the sepa-
rability doctrine will come at a price to both disputants and adjudicators.  That
price, however, must be paid to ensure that no dispute is sent to arbitration
unless the parties have formed an enforceable contract requiring arbitration of
that dispute.  In short, the practical advantages the separability doctrine pro-
vides should be sacrificed in order to ensure that the right to litigate receives
the protection of contract-law’s defenses to enforcement.  The latter is worth
sacrificing the former.
I do not think it is a coincidence that advocates of the separability doctrine
are found most commonly among those who have written extensively on inter-
national arbitration.149  Whether to have the separability doctrine is, at bottom,
a question of how much importance one places on (1) the right to litigation and
(2) the protection provided by contract-law’s defenses to enforcement.  Each of
these factors is generally less important in the international context than in the
domestic context.  In the international context, the right to litigation is of less
practical value because courts, and the enforcement of judgments, tend to be
less reliable.  And the types of parties typically forming international arbitration
agreements (governments and large corporations) can generally be expected to
protect themselves from the conduct that would give rise to a contract defense
better than the ordinary individuals who often form domestic arbitration agree-
ments.  So I can understand why international arbitration specialists would
reject my call for repeal of the separability doctrine.  I ask only that, in doing
See Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is
easy to cry fraud.”); W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION 540 (1997) (“[I]t is all too easy for a party seeking to derail an arbitration at its incep-
tion to claim that the main agreement was or had become invalid.”).  Perhaps parties who
refuse to go to arbitration without a court’s determination that the container contract is
enforceable should, if they lose on that determination, be required to pay the other side’s
legal fees and costs.  Additional sanctions might also be imposed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
148 For example, in Prima Paint, if a court had sent F&C’s claim for payment to arbitration
only after determining that Prima Paint’s consent to the consulting agreement was not
induced by misrepresentation, the court would have already decided much of the dispute it
was sending to arbitration because Prima Paint’s argument on the merits, its defense to pay-
ment, was misrepresentation.
In the absence of the separability doctrine, courts deciding whether to send disputes to
arbitration often would, as in this example, become entangled with the merits of the dispute.
If the court sent a dispute to arbitration after effectively ruling on the merits, the arbitrator
would have two choices.  The arbitrator could reconsider the merits de novo, which would
require the parties to adjudicate the merits twice and create the possibility of inconsistent
results.  Or the arbitrator could rubber-stamp the court’s view of the merits, which would
make the arbitration agreement effectively unenforceable because the parties would get a
court’s, rather than an arbitrator’s, decision on the merits.
149 See SCHWEBEL, supra note 96; Speidel, supra note 107; Barceló, supra note 22; Park,
supra note 119; Rau supra note 3; Smit, supra note 134.  By contrast, the only scholars I can
recall criticizing the separability doctrine are people who have written more on domestic,
than international, arbitration.  In addition to me, that short list includes Kenneth R. Davis, A
Model for Arbitration Law:  Autonomy, Cooperation and Curtailment of State Power, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 167, 195-96 (1998); Reuben, supra note 55; and Jeffrey W. Stempel, A
Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1456-59 (1991).
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so, they acknowledge that they are depriving the right to litigate of the protec-
tion provided by contract-law’s defenses to enforcement.  In other words, I ask
that they acknowledge that the separability doctrine—unlike nearly all the rest
of arbitration law—is incompatible with, and thus cannot be justified as an
application of, contract law.
